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CLASSIFYING OBESITY AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: HOW SEFF V. 
BROWARD COUNTY IS INCONGRUENT WITH RECENT 
ADA LITIGATION 
Maura Flaherty McCoy+ 
“During the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in obesity in the 
United States and rates remain high. More than one-third of U.S. adults (34.9%) 
and approximately 17% (or 12.7 million) of children and adolescents aged 2–19 
years have obesity.” 1   Largely due to an increase in obesity rates, many 
employers have adopted corporate wellness programs in an effort to reduce 
insurance claims and improve the productivity and health of their workforce.2  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or “Obamacare,” contains 
                                                            
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2004, Georgetown University.  The author would like to thank her parents, James and Alice, for 
their encouragement and support, and her husband, Matthew, for his unconditional love and 
patience.  She would also like to thank her Catholic University Law Review colleagues who helped 
prepare this Note for publication. 
 1. Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
obesity/data/facts.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2014).  Obese individuals are identified by a body 
mass index outside a certain range, calculated using a person’s weight and height to determine his 
amount of body fat.  About BMI for Adults, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://m.cdc.gov/en/HealthSafetyTopics/HealthyLiving/HealthyWeight/AssessingYourWeight/Bo
dyMassIndex/AboutBMIAdults (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).  An adult with a BMI between 25 and 
29.9 is considered overweight, and anyone with a BMI of 30 or higher is considered obese.  Id.  A 
2009 study estimated that the medical cost of obesity in America was $147 billion annually and 
that medical costs for obese individuals were $1,429 higher per year than people of a normal weight.  
Press Release, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/presrel/2009/r090727.htm.  In 2009–2010, 35.7 percent of adults in the 
United States were obese, and 16.9 percent of children and adolescents were obese.  Cynthia L. 
Ogden, Margaret D. Carroll, Brian K. Kit & Katherine M. Flegal, Prevalence of Obesity in the 
United States, 2009–2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1–2 (2012), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db82.pdf.  During these years there was no significant 
difference between men and women at any age, though women ages sixty and over were more 
obese than younger women.  Id. 
 2. Laura Anderko, Jason S. Roffenbendner, Ron Z. Goetzel, Francois Millard, Kevin 
Wildenhaus, Charles DeSantis & William Novelli, Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable 
Care Act: Workplace Wellness, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/12_0092.htm.  In addition: 
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), worksite wellness programs will 
become part of a national public health strategy to address the increase in chronic 
diseases, which are predicted to cost the US health care system an estimated $4.2 trillion 
annually by 2023. Evidence suggests that worksite wellness programs are cost-beneficial, 
saving companies money in health-care expenditures and producing a positive return on 
investment (ROI). 
Id.  It is calculated that there is “an average return of $3.27 in medical costs for every dollar spent 
on worksite wellness programs.”  Id. 
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several provisions that promote and help facilitate the implementation of 
wellness programs. 3   The American Medical Association (AMA) House of 
Delegates recently joined The World Health Organization, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health in recognizing obesity as a 
disease, which means that roughly one-third of Americans will be classified as 
ill.4 
Although the AMA’s recent decision is not legally enforceable,5  and the 
AMA opposes the classification of obesity as a disability,6 the resolution raises 
the question of how discrimination claims by obese persons will be treated in 
the context of employer wellness programs.  “The Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 [(ADA)] prohibits discrimination and ensures equal opportunity for 
persons with disabilities in employment, State and local government services, 
public accommodations, commercial facilities, and transportation.”7  The AMA 
defines a disease as “an impairment of the normal functioning of some aspect of 
the body,” 8  and the ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”9  The 
treatment of obese individuals in employer wellness programs could be grounds 
for discrimination claims under the ADA, depending on how courts choose to 
define “disability.”10 
Courts’ treatment of what is considered a “disability” has evolved over time, 
especially subsequent to the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 
                                                            
 3. Id.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was passed by Congress in March 
2010, with the goal of improving health care coverage for all Americans.  Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 588 (2010) (codified at scattered titles 
and sections). 
 4. See Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, 
at B1, B5; Recognition of Obesity as a Disease, AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES (May 16, 
2013), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2013/jun/ama-resolution-obesity.pdf. 
 5. Pollack, supra note 4, at B1. 
 6. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 4. 
 7. Department of Justice, Information and Technical Assistance on the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/2010_regs.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014); see 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (providing the purpose of the ADA).  The ADA of 1990 was changed by 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.  Department of Justice, supra. 
 8. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 4.  The American Medical 
Association’s Council on Science and Public Health identifies a disease as “1) an impairment of 
the normal functioning of some aspect of the body; 2) characteristic signs or symptoms; and 3) 
harm or morbidity.”  Id.  The Resolution states that there is significant evidence to show that obesity 
is “a multi-metabolic and hormonal disease state” that impairs numerous bodily functions and is 
not merely the result of lifestyle choices.  Id.  The AMA House of Delegates stated, “[t]he 
suggestion that obesity is not a disease but rather a consequence of a chosen lifestyle exemplified 
by overeating and/or inactivity is equivalent to suggesting that lung cancer is not a disease because 
it was brought about by individual choice to smoke cigarettes.”  Id. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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2008. 11   Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court took a limited view of what 
constituted a disability and had stricter standards for discrimination.12  The Court 
considered mitigating circumstances when evaluating the severity of a 
disability13 and interpreted “substantially impairs” and “major life activity” very 
broadly to disqualify employees who could not perform specific work tasks.14 
Following initial ADA cases, Congress determined that the intent of the ADA 
was not being fulfilled and passed an Amendments Act to further clarify the 
standards for discrimination.15  The Americans with Disabilities Amendments 
Act of 2008 specifically overturned Sutton v. United Air Lines16 and Toyota 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams17 to broaden the scope of coverage 
for disabled employees making discrimination claims.18  Where courts were 
once reluctant to classify obesity as a disability except for instances in which 
obesity was related to an underlying physiological disorder, 19  the 2008 
amendments have led courts to broaden their treatment of obesity as a 
disability.20  The new standards for the ADA have coincided with the advent of 
employer wellness programs, which are designed to improve employees’ health 
                                                            
 11. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)).  The 
ADA was originally enacted against the backdrop of the finding that “43,000,000 Americans have 
one or more physical or mental disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990) (amended 2008).  In 
addition, “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).  The ADA sought “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2012).  
Regardless of whether a person has an actual disability as defined by the court, an employee may 
sue for being discriminated against because their employer perceives them to be disabled.  See id. 
§ 12102(1)(C) (including “regarded as having” a disability under the definition of disability). 
 12. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187, 200–01 (2002) 
(deciding that an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome was not disabled because her 
daily life activities were not impaired, only certain job-related tasks were affected); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–82, 490–94 (1999) (holding that United Air Lines correctly 
applied the ADA when considering whether to hire severely myopic twins who applied to be pilots, 
by considering that their impairment could be mitigated through corrective lenses, but that United 
did not discriminate because the vision requirement did not substantially limit the twins). 
 13. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481–82. 
 14. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200–01. 
 15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 16. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 17. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 18. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 §§ 2(b)(2)–(4), 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. § 
705 (2012)). 
 19. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 20. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 230 (Mont. 2012) (citing EEOC v. Res. for 
Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011)) (concluding that obesity itself can be 
a disability). 
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and well-being, lower medical claim costs, and encourage disease prevention 
practices.21 
Many wellness programs offer incentives in the form of reduced health 
insurance premiums for employees who participate in the program or meet 
certain health-related standards. 22   Though programs that merely require 
participation to qualify for an incentive are not subject to federal discrimination 
laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the 
ADA,23  cases are starting to emerge that call into question the viability of 
wellness programs and how strictly employers may regulate their employees’ 
health.24  For example, in Seff v. Broward County,25 the plaintiff challenged the 
“voluntariness” of Broward County’s wellness initiative in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, following a holding for the defendant in the 
district court.26  In an effort to stem rising health care costs, Broward County 
implemented a wellness program that aimed to incentivize employees to take 
preventative health care measures and to engage in disease management.27  The 
plaintiff in Seff chose not to participate in the wellness program, which required 
a biometric screening and a health risk assessment, and, as a result, a twenty-
dollar surcharge was added to his paycheck each pay period.28 
The ADA prohibits employers from requiring medical examinations or 
making medically-related inquiries of their employees,29 but it also provides an 
                                                            
 21. Soeren Mattke, et al., RAND HEALTH, WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY xiii 
(2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/workplacewellnessstudyfinal.pdf.  Wellness 
programs are provided by about half of all employers with fifty or more employees and usually 
include a health risk assessment and clinical screenings to retrieve biometric data such as height, 
weight, body mass index, and blood glucose levels.  Id. at xiv, v.  Wellness programs typically 
consist of “screening activities to identify health risks . . . [,] preventive interventions to address 
manifest health risks . . . [, and] health promotion activities to further healthy lifestyles.”  Id. at 21. 
 22. See id. at 67. 
 23. Id. at 68. 
 24. See, e.g., Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 
(providing a detailed review of an employee wellness program), aff’d 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
 25. 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 26. Id. at 1222. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).  Under the ADA, an employer may make varying 
degrees of inquiry into an employee’s disability status or medical conditions depending on if the 
inquiries are pre-offer, post-offer, or during employment.  Id. §§ 12112(d)(2)–(3).  Prior to 
employment, the ADA prohibits all medical and disability inquiries regardless of whether or not 
they are related to the job.  Id. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A).  After an employee is offered a position, the 
employer may make any inquiries into an employee’s medical history, regardless of whether or not 
they are related to the job, as long as the employer treats all entering employees equally.  Id. § 
12112(d)(3)(A).  After employment begins, an employer may make inquiries “only if they are job-
related and consistent with business necessity.”  EEOC NOTICE 915.002, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES 
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exemption from these prohibitions for voluntary wellness programs that meet 
certain criteria.30   Mr. Seff argued that the wellness program was not truly 
voluntary because nonparticipation in the program resulted in a penalty. 31  
However, in granting summary judgment to the defendant, the district court did 
not address the voluntariness of the program because it found that the county’s 
wellness program met the requirements of the ADA’s safe harbor provision.32 
This Note discusses how employer-promoted wellness programs are potential 
breeding grounds for discrimination claims in light of recent ADA cases relating 
to obesity and how courts’ treatment of the safe harbor provision of the ADA is 
incongruent with the broadening of ADA claims.  It begins with an examination 
of the ADA and looks at how courts have considered the definition of 
“disability” in regard to obesity.  In addition, it provides a description of the 
ADA safe harbor provision and continues with a discussion of the development 
of company wellness programs that led to Seff v. Broward County.  This is 
followed by an analysis of how the Seff decision, combined with the recent 
treatment of obesity under the ADA and the safe harbor provision, reveals a 
disconnect between the judicial system’s increasing leniency toward obese 
individuals and broad allowance of organizations to potentially discriminate 
against individuals under the guise of corporate wellness programs. 
                                                            
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) (2000) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html. 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2). 
 31. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  According to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a wellness program is voluntary if an 
employer does not require participation and does not penalize employees for not participating.  
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29. 
 32. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 n.3.  See Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Supporting Memorandum of Law, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011) (No. 10-CV-61437), 2011 WL 10795884.  The safe harbor provision of the ADA 
expressly allows an organization to establish, sponsor, observe, or administer “the terms of a bona 
fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks 
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2).  See Parker v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).  In Parker, a panel of the court decided that the safe 
harbor provision of the ADA was ambiguous and looked to legislative history for guidance.  Id. at 
1009.  The panel decided that “insurance practices are protected by the ‘safe harbor’ provision, but 
only to the extent that they are consistent with ‘sound actuarial principles,’ ‘actual reasonably 
anticipated experience,’ and ‘bona fide risk classification.’”  Id.  The safe harbor provision does 
not provide protection to employers if the insurance plan or program is merely subterfuge, which 
is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).  The court found that under the ADA an insurance plan 
qualifies as a subterfuge “if it is ‘based on speculation, and not on sound actuarial principles, actual 
or reasonably anticipated experience, or bona fide risk classification.’”  Parker, 121 F.3d at 1000. 
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I.  COURTS TACKLE OBESITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AND THE SAFE HARBOR 
PROVISION UNDER THE ADA 
A.  Impairment Must Have an Underlying Physiological Cause 
The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”33  When courts began 
hearing ADA cases in the early 1990s, the definition of “impairment” was 
interpreted narrowly and did not encompass any condition that lacked an 
underlying physiological cause.34  Courts have not defined “physiological” in 
any certain terms, but instead have referred to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) definition of impairment to determine if a 
disability has an underlying physiological cause.35  According to the EEOC, 
impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems” or “any 
mental or psychological disorder.”36 
For example, in Andrews v. Ohio,37 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed a discrimination claim because it did not view obesity as 
having an underlying physiological cause.38  In Andrews, a group of Ohio State 
Highway Patrol officers sued the State of Ohio when they failed the Highway 
                                                            
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a).  This Note focuses on Title I of the ADA as it relates to 
employment claims.  See id. §§ 12111–12117.  Title II relates to public entities and public 
transportation.  See id. §§ 12131–12165.  Title III relates to public accommodations.  See id. §§ 
12181–12189.  The statute specifies that a disability is not to be “transitory and minor.”  Id. § 
12102(3)(b).  The statute also includes a general list of major life activities that the impairment 
could limit: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 
communicating, and working.”  Id. § 12102(2)(a); see Disability Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014).  In a 2006 case out of the Eastern District of New York, the court held: 
In order to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) that 
the plaintiff’s employer is subject to the ADA; (2) that the plaintiff was disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA; (3) that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the 
essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) 
that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his or her disability. 
Spiegel v. Schulmann, No. 03-CV-5088, 2006 WL 3483922, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006). 
 34. See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of 
Meridien, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 35. See Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 443–44; Francis, 129 F.3d at 283; Andrews, 104 
F.3d at 808.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines physiology as “a branch of biology that 
deals with the functions and activities of life or of living matter (as organs, tissues, or cells) and of 
the physical and chemical phenomena involved.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physiology (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2012).  The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for 
enforcing the ADA. 
 37. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 38. Id. at 810. 
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Patrol Fitness Program (HPFP). 39   The HPFP established a set of physical 
endurance and strength criteria for its officers that included maximum weight 
limits.40  The officers argued that the weight limits were unrelated to the job and 
that enforcement of the limits was discriminatory because of the perceived 
failure of the officers in the eyes of their supervisors for being overweight.41 
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ claims because even if the officers 
did in fact face discrimination, they did not properly allege a perceived 
“impairment.”42  The court held that “physical characteristics that are ‘not the 
result of a physiological disorder’ are not considered ‘impairments’ for the 
purposes of determining either actual or perceived disability.”43  The court stated 
that a commonplace physical characteristic alone does not constitute a 
physiological disorder, and, consequently, granted the state’s motion to 
dismiss.44 
In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced a similar 
situation regarding an employee whose weight exceeded a weight/fitness 
requirement for city firefighters.45  In Francis v. City of Meridien,46 a firefighter 
did not meet the height/weight requirement and refused to complete the physical 
fitness test that was required if the weight requirement was not met.47  As a 
                                                            
 39. Id. at 805–06. 
 40. Id. at 805. 
 41. Id. at 806.  It is the responsibility of the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Id. at 808.  The court compared the situation to Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 
F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984), in which a prospective flight attendant exceeded the weight-for-
height limit not because he was overweight but because he had too much muscle mass.  Andrews, 
104 F.3d at 809.  The Tudyman court did not find that there was any discrimination because the 
flight attendant’s physique was voluntary and not the result of a physiological disorder.  See 
Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.  The Andrews court held, “[b]ecause a mere physical characteristic 
does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder, where an employee’s failure to meet the 
employer’s job criteria is based solely on the possession of such a physical characteristic, the 
employee does not sufficiently allege a cause of action.”  Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810. 
 42. Id. at 810. 
 43. Id. at 808. 
 44. Id.  To hold a mere physical characteristic as an impairment would distort the “concept of 
an impairment [which] implies a characteristic that is not commonplace” and would thereby 
“debase [the] high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped.”  
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Jasany v. USPS, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 
(6th Cir. 1985)).  The Forrisi court stated: 
The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will 
not face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about the 
insurmountability of their handicaps.  It would debase this high purpose if the statutory 
protections available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose 
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared. 
Id. 
 45. Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 282 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 46. 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 47. Id. at 282.  Some argue that the reason courts are reluctant to consider obesity a disability 
is because society believes that the obese individual is responsible for his/her weight problem.  Jane 
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result, the fire department suspended him.48  The firefighter alleged that the 
city’s discipline for his failure to meet the weight requirement was 
discriminatory because the city perceived that he had a disability.49  The court, 
as in Andrews, referred to the definition of “physical impairment” under the 
ADA and quoted the EEOC regulation that stated: 
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments 
and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic 
characteristics that are not impairments.  The definition of the term 
“impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye 
color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that 
are within “normal” range and are not the result of a physiological 
disorder.50 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal.51  The employee’s 
weight was not considered an impairment under the ADA due to the lack of an 
underlying physiological cause and because the employer did not perceive the 
employee as suffering from a physiologically-caused condition.52 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Watkins 
Motor Lines, Inc. 53 was similar to the Second Circuit’s holding in Francis but 
also signaled a slight shift in the court’s interpretation.54  In Watkins Motor 
Lines, a driver/dockworker filed a claim alleging discrimination after he was 
terminated due to his morbid obesity.55  The court held that morbid obesity may 
be considered an ADA impairment if accompanied by an underlying 
physiological cause, but it refused to acknowledge the EEOC’s argument that 
morbid obesity is more than a commonplace, normal physical characteristic.56  
                                                            
Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209, 211 (2010).  The social stigma of being overweight, 
and the belief that a person’s weight is voluntary, hampers the courts’ ability to consider obesity as 
a disability.  Id.  There are differing opinions on the degree of voluntariness involved in obesity, 
but the problem facing courts often lies in the fact that the cause of any certain individual’s obesity 
is a mixture of multiple factors and often difficult to determine.  Id. at 224. 
 48. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282. 
 49. Id. at 282–83. 
 50. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2012)). 
 51. Id. at 287. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 438–39. 
 56. Id. at 444–45; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2012) (defining “physical impairment” 
as requiring some physiological disorder).  The court in Watkins Motor Lines stated: 
The plaintiffs’ conditions were far from constituting an ADA impairment as, not only 
were the plaintiffs’ conditions not physiologically caused, but they were not even 
abnormally obese.  To interpret the above sentence any other way would suggest that we 
held that any physical abnormality—for example, someone extremely tall or grossly 
short—may be ADA impairment.  We decline to extend ADA protection to all 
“abnormal” (whatever that term may mean) physical characteristics. 
Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 442–43. 
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As a result, the court concluded that the EEOC did not meet its burden of proving 
the existence of an impairment under the ADA.57  Both Francis and Watkins 
Motor Lines emphasize the requirement of an underlying physiological cause in 
order for a disability to be covered under the ADA and demonstrate courts’ very 
narrow interpretation of discriminatory practices.58 
B.  The Expansion of Physical and Mental Impairments 
Andrews, Francis, and Watkins Motor Lines were decided prior to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008 (ADAA). 59   Cases 
decided after the passage of the 2008 Amendments reached very different 
conclusions regarding the need for an underlying physiological cause to qualify 
as having a disability.60  By eliminating the courts’ use of mitigating factors in 
evaluating disabilities and lifting strict limits on what constitutes the substantial 
impairment of a life activity, the ADAA broadened the definition of disability 
to cover impairments previously excluded from discriminatory claims.61 
In the 2013 case Anderson v. Macy’s, Inc.,62 a patron of Macy’s stores alleged 
discrimination under Title III of the ADA.  The discrimination claim was based 
on the fact that Macy’s had priced plus-size items higher than smaller sizes, 
placed plus-size clothing in hidden parts of the store, and made plus-size 
                                                            
 57. Id. at 445. 
 58. See id.; Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Andrews 
v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (relying on the federal definition of impairment when 
finding law enforcement officers’ weight was not an impairment because it was not the result of an 
underlying physiological condition). 
 59. See Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 436 (decided in 2006); Francis, 129 F.3d at 281 
(decided in 1997); Andrews, 104 F.3d at 803 (decided in 1997); see also ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–
12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)) (demonstrating that the Amendments were 
enacted in 2008, following the previous cases). 
 60. Compare Francis, 129 F.3 at 287 (finding that when a firefighter was disciplined for 
exceeding weight requirements, his weight was not a disability under the ADA because it lacked 
an underlying cause), and Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (holding that law enforcement officers’ weight 
was not an impairment under the ADA because there was no underlying physiological condition), 
with BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012) (finding that obesity without an 
underlying physiological cause could be considered a physical impairment if the weight is outside 
the normal range), and EEOC v. Res. of Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. La. 
2011) (deciding that obesity is considered a disability under the ADA, even if there is no underlying 
cause). 
 61. Amendments Act § 4(a), § 2(a)(4)–(7) (explaining that Congress did not intend for the 
Supreme Court to narrow the definition of individuals with disabilities, and “as a result of these 
Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a 
range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities.”).  The Amendments 
Act of 2008 overturned the Supreme Court’s holdings in Sutton v. United Air Lines and Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams. See id. § 2(b). 
 62. 943 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
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clothing aisles narrower than other aisles.63  The U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the patron’s complaints regarding 
pricing and location within the store, but recognized that narrow aisles may be a 
valid ADA claim because they were not wide enough to accommodate her.64  
Though the court acknowledged one of the plaintiff’s alleged obesity claims, the 
Anderson case did not go as far as explicitly categorizing obesity as a disability 
under the ADAA.65  In 2009, an applicant to the Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railway Company (BNSF) filed a complaint with the Montana Department of 
Labor and Industry alleging that BNSF refused to hire him because of his 
obesity.66  Following the department’s ruling in favor of the applicant, BNSF 
filed an appeal with the Montana Human Rights Commission, who confirmed 
the department’s decision.67  BNSF then petitioned the district court, which 
certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court to address whether obesity 
could be categorized as a “physical or mental impairment.”68 
The Montana Supreme Court recognized that the ADAA intended “a broad 
scope of protection to be available” and “the definition of disability . . . shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage.” 69   The court considered the EEOC 
                                                            
 63. Id. at 535–36; see id. at 543–45 (explaining that although no other district court had 
recognized obesity as a disability under the ADA, in light of the 2008 Amendments, the court was 
unwilling to definitively exclude obesity as a disability); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) 
(stating that under Title III of the ADA, which covers public accommodations and commercial 
facilities, individuals with disabilities must not be denied equal opportunities to enjoy commercial 
goods and services offered). 
 64. Anderson, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 547–50 (dismissing the entire claim without prejudice to 
give the plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint better articulating the claim 
regarding the aisle width). 
 65. Compare id. at 548–50 (dismissing multiple claims made by an obese plaintiff regarding 
the price and location of plus-sized clothing at Macy’s, but acknowledging that she may have an 
ADA claim regarding the narrow aisles in which the plus-sized clothes were located), with Feit, 
281 P.3d at 231 (finding that obesity without an underlying physiological cause could be considered 
a disability when plaintiff alleged he was not hired due to his weight). 
 66. Id. at 227. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 227–28.  BNSF told the conductor trainee applicant that he was not qualified 
“because of the ‘significant health and safety risks associated with extreme obesity.’”  Id. at 227.  
In addition, BNSF told the individual that he needed to lose ten percent of his body weight or 
complete physical exams in order to be considered.  Id. 
 69. Id. at 228 (omission in original) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 2, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554–55 (2008)).  The EEOC noted, prior to the Amendments of 
2008, that being overweight was generally not an impairment but that “severe obesity, which has 
been defined as body weight more than 100% over the norm is clearly an impairment.”  EEOC 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.2(C)(5)(ii) (2011) (internal citations omitted), available at 
http://www/eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (noting pre-2000 precedent).  This section of the 
compliance manual was removed from the EEOC website on July 25, 2012, because it was 
superseded by the Amendments Act of 2008.  David M. Katz, Obesity as a Covered Disability 
Under the ADA, DAILY LABOR REPORT, BLOOMBERG BUREAU OF NAT’L AFF., INC., Oct. 5, 2012, 
at 2, available at http://www.employmentmattersblog.com/files/2014/05/obesity-as-a-covered-
disability-under-the-ADA-oct.-5-2012.pdf. 
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Compliance Manual’s statement that “[t]he mere presence of an impairment 
does not automatically mean that an individual has a disability.  Whether severe 
obesity rises to the level of a disability will turn on whether the obesity 
substantially limits, has substantially limited, or is regarded as substantially 
limiting, a major life activity.” 70   In light of the ADAA and the EEOC 
guidelines, the court sided with the job applicant, holding that his obesity 
qualified as a disability because his weight was outside a normal range and 
affected one or more body systems.71 
Applying a similar analysis, EEOC v. Resources for Human Development, 
Inc.72 recognized severe obesity as a disability.73  The plaintiff was hired as a 
specialist at a long-term residential treatment facility for drug-dependent women 
in 1999 and was subsequently terminated eight years later.74  She was severely 
obese throughout her tenure as an employee and had multiple conditions as a 
result of her obesity, such as diabetes, congestive heart failure, and 
hypertension.75  The EEOC argued, and the court recognized, that neither the 
EEOC nor any other court “[has] ever required a disabled party to prove the 
underlying basis of [his] impairment” and “[t]he cause of a condition has no 
effect on whether that condition is an impairment.”76  The U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that summary judgment for the 
employer was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact 
as to how the employer perceived the plaintiff and her ability to perform her 
essential job functions.77  The cases disregarding the need for an underlying 
physiological impairment and recognizing obesity as a legitimate disability 
signal a shift in the way courts are interpreting the ADA, and reveal the possible 
expansion of discrimination claims.78 
                                                            
 70. Feit, 281 P.3d at 230 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 
902.2(c)(5)(ii) n.16). 
 71. Id. at 231; see also MT Joins Obesity Debate: No Underlying Condition Necessary to 
Prove a Disability, 23 ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL., no. 9 , Sept. 2012, at 7. 
 72. 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 73. Id. at 695. 
 74. Id. at 690.  The plaintiff weighed 527 pounds at the time of her termination and 
subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.  Id. at 690.  She passed away shortly 
thereafter, and the EEOC filed the lawsuit on behalf of her estate.  Id. at 691. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 694 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.2(e) (2011) (internal citations 
omitted), available at http://www/eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html).  In the case, the plaintiff 
stated “[t]o require establishment of the underlying cause of the impairment in a morbid obesity 
[case], but not in any other disability cases, would epitomize the very prejudices and stereotypes 
which the ADA was passed to address.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 77. Id. at 700. 
 78. See generally supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.  Cf. Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 
803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that obesity did not qualify as a legitimate disability because there 
was no physiological impairment). 
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C.  The Safe Harbor Provision and the ADA 
The safe harbor provision of the ADA, as enacted in 1990, provides an 
exemption for employers to avoid discrimination claims by employees.79  Under 
the safe harbor provision, bona fide benefit plans are not subject to state laws 
regulating insurance, or to ADA claims, unless there is proof of subterfuge and 
an intent to evade the statute.80  In 2008, “Congress created an exception to 
enable organizations to sponsor or provide bona fide benefit plans not subject to 
state insurance laws even if they offer different terms to disabled individuals.”81  
There have been numerous cases in which discriminatory benefits practices by 
an employer would have been subject to the ADA, yet the safe harbor provision 
shielded the employer from claims by employees.82 
Courts have treated the safe harbor provision similarly both before and after 
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.83  In a notable case from 2000, EEOC v. 
Aramark Corp.,84 a food service manager worked at Aramark for ten years 
before a mental illness forced her to leave.85  She received long-term disability 
payments through the company’s insurance carrier following her termination.86  
However, the long-term disability insurance plan provided only twenty-four 
months of coverage for mental disabilities, but would have continued payments 
until age sixty-five had the disability been physical.87  The employee argued that 
the plan’s differing benefit terms for mental and physical disabilities constituted 
discrimination under the ADA.88  The court rejected the EEOC’s argument and 
                                                            
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3) (2012) (noting an exception regarding benefit plans); see 
also Grant P. H. Shuman, Escaping the Purpose of the ADA: The “Safe Harbor” Provision and 
Disability-Based Distinctions in Insurance Policies and Programs, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 549, 556–58 
(2000–01) (recognizing a conflict between the aims of the ADA and legitimate insurance needs). 
 80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3). 
 81. Rouse v. Berry, 848 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the employer’s 
curtailment of long-term care benefits for a disabled employee was not “subterfuge” to evade the 
ADA).  A bona fide benefit plan is defined as a plan that “exists and pays benefits.”  Id. (quoting 
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 166 (1989)).  Courts have interpreted 
subterfuge to mean “a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.”  Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 
1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Betts, 492 U.S. at 167).  Proof of subterfuge must be relatively 
overt and requires a showing of discriminatory intent and not just a lack of actuarial justification.  
EEOC v. Aramark Corp., Inc., 208 F.3d 266, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 271–73; Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
 83. See generally infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (comparing a court’s holding in 
2008 on the safe harbor provision of the ADA with a post-2008 holding following the enactment 
of the ADA Amendments). 
 84. 208 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 85. Id. at 267. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  The EEOC argued that the twenty-four month limit on benefits for a mental disability 
violated ADA §§ 12111–17, which prohibit an employer from discriminating “against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to [the] terms, 
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found that Aramark’s long-term disability insurance fell under the safe harbor 
provision of the ADA as a bona fide benefits plan.89  The court asserted that the 
benefits fell under the safe harbor provision not only because Aramark’s plan 
was adopted before the ADA,90 but also because “subterfuge to evade” does not 
mean there is solely a lack of actuarial data to support the existence of the 
benefits plan; there must be a more substantial claim of discrimination made by 
the plaintiff.91  The decision allowed for an employee with a mental illness to be 
treated differently than other employees and to be discriminated against only 
because her employer’s insurance fell under the safe harbor provision.92 
Similarly, in the post-2008 case Rouse v. Berry,93 a paraplegic government 
employee filed a complaint against the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
when he was denied long-term care insurance due to his use of a wheelchair.94  
OPM justified its policy by relying on industry experience and underwriting 
reports from the insurance carriers about the level of risk involved in the plan 
for the employer.95  The court determined that, as in Aramark, there must be 
overt evidence of subterfuge in order to exempt the benefit plan from the safe 
harbor provision.96  These cases provide wide latitude to employers to establish 
benefit plans that are discriminatory by arguing that treatment of the safe harbor 
provision by the courts has not changed since the ADAA.97  The advent of 
wellness programs has opened the door for potentially discriminatory use of the 
safe harbor provision, as demonstrated by Seff v. Broward County.98 
                                                            
conditions, and privileges of employment.”  Id. (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2012)). 
 89. See id. at 268. 
 90. Id. at 269. 
 91. Id. at 271.  The court cited Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), 
which stated, “[w]e will not construe section 501(c) to require a seismic shift in the insurance 
business, namely requiring insurers to justify their coverage plans in court after a mere allegation 
by a plaintiff.” Aramark, 208 F.3d at 271 (quoting Ford, 145 F.3d at 612). 
 92. See Aramark, 208 F.3d at 267–68 (discussing the differences between insurance 
coverage). 
 93. 848 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. See id. at 6–7.  This use of actuarial data is consistent with the requirements outlined in 
the safe harbor provision of the ADA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012). 
 96. Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 13; see Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (providing a detailed discussion of subterfuge). 
 97. See Aramark, 208 F.3d at 267; Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
 98. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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II.  SEFF V. BROWARD COUNTY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR ADA OBESITY 
CLAIMS 
The ADA Amendments of 2008 were successful in persuading courts to 
broaden the scope of coverage for obese individuals. 99   The Amendments 
coincided with a rise in employer wellness programs in the workplace and 
employers’ goal of improving the health of their employees, including reducing 
their weight. 100   Employers have adopted wellness programs to encourage 
disease prevention and, ultimately, to lower medical insurance costs and 
improve productivity.101  Wellness programs utilize a variety of incentives to 
motivate employees to participate, such as reduced health insurance premium 
payments with no penalties for non-participation.102 
Employers must be careful not to run afoul of several federal regulations when 
offering incentives or imposing penalties.103  The nondiscrimination provisions 
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) make it 
illegal to deny eligibility for benefits or to charge more for group health coverage 
based on a health factor, although certain exceptions allow wellness programs 
to offer incentives when particular requirements are met. 104   HIPAA will 
generally not apply if a wellness program is structured so that conditions for 
obtaining an incentive are not based on an employee meeting a certain health 
standard, participation in the program is voluntary, and the plan is made 
available to all similarly-situated individuals.105 
                                                            
 99. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2–4, 122 Stat. 3553–56 
(2008); Anderson v. Macy’s, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543–45 (W.D. Pa. 2013); BNSF Ry. Co. 
v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012); see also Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24-
A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (holding that a plaintiff whose obesity 
caused her inability to walk from the regular company parking lot may be able to prove she was 
terminated due to her impairment).  In Lowe, despite the defendant’s assertion that “obesity is not 
a disabling impairment,” “the Court is unable to say that obesity can never be a disability under the 
ADA, especially given that on September 25, 2008, the ADA was amended by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.”  Id. at *6. 
 100. See Mattke, supra note 21, at 1–3. 
 101. See id. at 3.  The RAND study found that results-based incentives in wellness programs 
are usually administered through the employer rather than the employer’s health plan.  See id. at 
xxi.  Researchers caution that long-term studies are necessary to demonstrate the cost-benefits of 
wellness programs.  See id. at 3 (noting that those programs are relatively new).  A recent review 
found that the return on investment is 3:1 for direct medical cost and absenteeism, but stated that 
these results may not be typical. Id.; see also Katerine Baicker, et al., Workplace Wellness 
Programs Can Generate Savings, 29:2 HEALTH AFFS. (2010) (discussing the benefits of wellness 
programs). 
 102. Mattke, supra note 21, at xxi.  Employers most often reported using incentives rather than 
penalties in the administration of wellness programs.  For example, common incentives may come 
in the form of cash or health insurance premium surcharges, gym discounts, and novelty items such 
as t-shirts.  Id. 
 103. See id. at 66 (providing the basic provisions that govern incentive programs). 
 104. Id. at 66–67. 
 105. Id. at 67.  The Affordable Care Act incorporates the HIPAA nondiscrimination rules but 
permits the value of wellness program incentives up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage in 
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Similarly, the ADA prohibits employers from penalizing, or having a reward 
withheld from, individuals with health conditions that qualify as a disability.106  
Seff v. Broward County is the first federal case that addressed employer wellness 
programs and the limits that employers may set to incentivize and penalize their 
employees for engaging in a wellness program.107  A public employee brought 
a class action suit against Broward County, Florida, alleging that the 
government’s wellness program violated the ADA.108  The employee claimed 
that the employer violated the ADA by requiring that employees undergo a 
medical examination and disclose certain medical conditions as part of a 
voluntary wellness program.109 
Employees who fit into any of five disease categories identified by the 
employer were encouraged to participate in a disease management coaching 
program.110  Though participation in the county’s wellness program was not 
required to enroll in the group health plan, in 2010, the county attempted to 
encourage more participation by levying a twenty-dollar surcharge on each 
                                                            
2014 as opposed to HIPAA’s twenty percent.  Id.  The statute also gives discretion to federal 
department secretaries to increase the reward to up to fifty percent of the cost of coverage.  Id.  A 
wellness program may not be discriminatory under HIPAA if it meets HIPAA’s requirements, but 
the same program may be discriminatory under the ADA.  HIPAA outlines five requirements for 
wellness programs: 
(1) The total reward for all the plan’s wellness programs that require satisfaction of a 
standard related to a health factor must not exceed 20 percent of the cost of employee-
only coverage under the plan. If dependents (such as spouses and/or dependent children) 
may participate in the wellness program, the reward must not exceed 20 percent of the 
cost of the coverage in which an employee and any dependents are enrolled. 
(2) The program must be reasonably designed to promote health and prevent disease. 
(3) The program must give individuals eligible to participate the opportunity to qualify 
for the reward at least once per year. 
(4) The reward must be available to all similarly situated individuals . . . .  The program 
must allow a reasonable alternative standard (or waiver of the initial standard) for 
obtaining the reward to any individual for whom it is unreasonably difficult because of a 
medical condition, or medically inadvisable, to satisfy the initial standard. 
(5) The plan must disclose in all materials describing the terms of the program and the 
availability of a reasonable alternative standard (or the possibility of a waiver of the initial 
standard). 
Id. 
 106. Id. at 68. 
 107. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1222–23 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 108. Id. at 1222. 
 109. Id.  Broward County offered its employees a group health insurance plan and, in 2009, 
began enrolling employees in its wellness program sponsored by the health insurer, Coventry 
Healthcare.  Id.  Participation in the wellness program required a biometric screening and an online 
heath-risk assessment questionnaire, and Coventry used the results to identify employees who fit 
into categories of “five disease states: asthma, hypertension, diabetes, congestive heart failure, or 
kidney disease.”  Id.  A biometric screening consisted of a finger prick to draw blood and measure 
glucose and cholesterol. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1222. 
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paycheck of employees who did not enroll.111  The plaintiff filed a class action 
suit alleging that the biometric screening and health risk assessment violated the 
ADA’s prohibition on “non-voluntary medical examinations and disability-
related inquiries.”112  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment, finding that the county’s wellness program constituted a 
“term” of the group health insurance plan and therefore fell within the safe 
harbor provision of the ADA.113  The court ruled that the ADA did not apply to 
the group health insurance plan, but did not reach the question of whether the 
twenty-dollar charge for failure to participate in the wellness program made the 
program involuntary, and, therefore, in violation of the ADA.114 
The plaintiff’s amended motion for class action certification and incorporated 
memorandum of law began with the premise that Broward County’s “voluntary” 
wellness program was, in reality, not truly voluntary.115  Mr. Seff alleged that 
the county’s required participation in a biometric screening and health risk 
assessment was in violation of ADA § 12112 because of the required disclosure 
of personal medical information.116  He argued that because he was charged 
twenty dollars per paycheck for not participating in the allegedly “voluntary” 
                                                            
 111. Id.  The plaintiff incurred the twenty-dollar charge on his paychecks for a period of 
roughly six months.  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1224.  The ADA contains a safe harbor provision that says the ADA “‘shall not be 
construed’ as prohibiting a covered entity ‘from establishing, sponsoring, observing or 
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying 
risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.’”  Id. at 1223 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012)).  The ADA provides a safe harbor provision that protects 
a defendant from discrimination claims if the difference in treatment of employees is justified by 
sound actuarial principles.  Id.  These disability-based distinctions may be made if the health plan 
meets the requirements of a bona fide benefit plan even if the disparate treatment has an adverse 
effect on disabled employees.  Id.  In addition, “[t]he ADA permits an employer to establish, 
sponsor, observe or administer the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting, 
classifying, or administering such risks.”  ADA Exception for Certain Health Insurance Plans, 6 
EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 46:9, 1 (2013).  It is up to the plaintiff to prove 
subterfuge, or knowing evasion by the defendant of ADA requirements.  See id. at 2.  “The 
subterfuge exception to the safe harbor provision requires that a plaintiff show that the employer 
specifically intended to discriminate based on a disability, whether the discrimination was aimed 
at fringe-benefit or non-fringe-benefit aspects of the employment relationship.”  Id. 
 114. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1224. 
 115. Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Class Action Certification & Incorporated Memorandum 
of Law at 2, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011), ECF No. 17. 
 116. See id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)).  Section 12112 prohibits an employer from 
inquiring about medical information and does not allow an employer to require employees to 
complete medical exams unless the inquiries and exam are job-related and necessary for the 
particular position of the employee, or the medical examinations are “part of an employee health 
program” and are voluntary.  § 12112(d)(4)(A)–(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b) (2013); see 
generally ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29 (providing explanations of what constitutes 
“medical examination” and “job-related”). 
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wellness program, the program was not voluntary by definition.117 Broward 
County opposed the plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against under the 
ADA, arguing that the twenty-dollar surcharge was needed to encourage 
employees to make healthy choices and to reduce the county’s health care 
costs.118  Though relying primarily on the safe harbor provision of the ADA to 
rebut the contention that § 12112, the clause that prohibits medical examinations 
and medical inquiries, was violated,119 the county also contested the alleged 
involuntariness of the program.120  Broward County noted that the EEOC’s 
administrative guidance is not binding on the court and that the EEOC itself has 
issued conflicting opinions on what “voluntary” really means.121  The EEOC 
urged the court to hold that “incentive-based wellness programs which do not 
exceed HIP[A]A’s 20% financial threshold are ‘voluntary’ and permissible 
under the ADA.”122 
The district court in Seff, while avoiding the issue of voluntariness in its 
decision to find for Broward County, relied on an expansive interpretation of the 
ADA’s safe harbor provision to validate the employer’s use of a twenty-dollar 
penalty for nonparticipation. 123   The district court, in granting summary 
                                                            
 117. See Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Class Action Certification & Incorporated 
Memorandum of Law, supra note 115, at 4.  The EEOC has defined a “voluntary” wellness program 
as one where an employer does not require participation and does not penalize employees for not 
participating.  ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q. 22. 
 118. Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law 
at 1–2, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011), ECF No. 35.  The county 
implemented the program to increase early disease detection and improve risk mitigation after 
receiving counseling from a healthcare consultant about stemming rising healthcare costs.  Id. at 3.  
Broward County argued that the wellness program “properly accommodates the need of the County 
to provide adequate financial incentives to encourage successful program participation while 
ensuring that such financial incentives do not become unduly coercive.”  Id. at 2.  Broward County 
implemented the wellness program in an effort to stem rising health care costs associated with the 
county’s “older, sicker” workforce.  See id. at 2–3. 
 119. See id. at 1, 8–12; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012) (“This Act shall not be construed to 
prohibit or restrict . . . [covered entities] from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering 
the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or 
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”). 
 120. Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law, 
supra note 118, at 12. 
 121. See id. at 13–14 (citing several EEOC opinions from 2004).  In early 2009, the EEOC 
stated that wellness programs with a financial fringe not exceeding twenty percent of the cost of 
health care coverage are considered voluntary; however, the EEOC later rescinded this statement 
and stated that it is continuing to examine the scope of voluntariness under the ADA.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 15. 
 123. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373–75 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 691 
F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012).  The ADA lays out four elements of the insurance safe harbor provision 
that must be met for employers to legally make medical inquiries: the wellness program must be a 
term of a bona fide benefit plan; the purpose of the program must be “based on underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering such risks”; the program must not be inconsistent with state law; 
and the wellness program must not be used as a “subterfuge” to evade the ADA.  Broward County’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 9.  The 
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judgment to Broward County, went through each element of the safe harbor 
provision to determine that the county’s wellness program met the exemption 
requirements to override § 12112 of the ADA.124  The most contested element, 
and the one on which Mr. Seff focused his appeal, was the requirement that the 
wellness program be a “term” of a bona fide benefit plan.125  The court reasoned 
that the program was a term of the health plan because the employer’s insurer, 
Coventry, paid for and administered the program and the only people eligible to 
participate were those individuals enrolled in the county’s health plan.126  The 
plaintiff argued that the program was not a term of the health plan because an 
employee could have enrolled in the health plan without participating in the 
wellness program.127  In addition, the wellness program offered its own benefits, 
such as disease coaching and medication cost waivers, which were independent 
from the health plan.128  These distinctions were tenuous at best.  The Seff 
decision is the first significant case to be litigated over the intersection of 
wellness programs and the ADA. 129   The case leaves many questions 
unanswered regarding the definition of “voluntary” and how employers must 
structure their programs to fall within the ADA’s safe harbor provision. 
III.  SEFF’S BROAD ENCOMPASSMENT OF THE ADA’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION 
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF VOLUNTARINESS LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR 
OBESITY CLAIMS 
A.  The Broad Interpretation of the Safe Harbor Provision is in Discord with 
Recent ADA Obesity Litigation 
The Seff court’s decision to ignore the issue of a wellness program’s potential 
violation of the ADA makes it difficult for employees to challenge wellness 
program requirements. 130   Through the ADA’s safe harbor provision, the 
decision paints a broad stroke of coverage for almost all types of wellness 
                                                            
county argued that the wellness program was implemented to assess the risks of insuring their 
employees and to help the county better administer its benefit plan.  Id. at 12.  It also argued that 
participation in the wellness program was not a condition to enroll in the group health plan, which, 
if it was, would be a clear penalty and preclude the program from being categorized as voluntary.  
Id.  The court in Seff agreed.  See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. at 1373 (noting that the plaintiff’s memorandum focused primarily on this issue). 
 126. Id. at 1372–73. 
 127. Id. at 1373. 
 128. Id. at 1372.  The court cited the inclusion of wellness program language in the county’s 
benefits plan handout as demonstrating that the program was a term of the group health plan.  Id. 
at 1373. 
 129. See Heather Baird, Note, Healthy Compromise: Reconciling Wellness Program Financial 
Incentives with Health Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1474, 1487 (2013). 
 130. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374–75. 
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programs, especially for those supposedly categorized as “voluntary.”131  The 
Seff case brings to light the practical application of the ADA to company 
wellness programs, and highlights two major issues: the breadth of the safe 
harbor provision and the stringency and standard by which wellness programs 
are deemed to be voluntary.132  Following the ADA Amendments of 2008, an 
increasing number of courts recognized obesity as a legitimate disability, 
regardless of the existence of an underlying physiological cause. 133   This 
expansion of coverage for previously excluded conditions—particularly obesity, 
which continues to rise in the United States134—is in contrast with the Seff 
court’s disregard for ADA prohibitions when a wellness program meets the 
criteria to fit within the ADA’s safe harbor provision.135 
The Seff court addressed the five factors necessary to exempt the county’s 
wellness program from ADA prohibitions on medical exams and inquiries, but 
did not analyze the factors in depth, leaving room for argument regarding what 
kind of wellness programs are actually exempted from ADA regulations.136  The 
first requirement is that the wellness program be a term of a bona fide health 
benefit plan.137  The court explained that Broward County’s wellness program 
was a term of the health plan because it was mentioned in a health plan 
document, the insurer sponsored the program, and the program was only 
available to health plan participants.138  According to the court, the mere mention 
of a wellness program in a health plan document results in the program 
automatically being considered a term of the health plan, making it seemingly 
easy for an employer to prove that a wellness program is a bona fide term.139 
Another prong, consistency with state law, was interpreted by the Seff court 
in favor of Broward County because Florida law authorized employers to offer 
                                                            
 131. See John L. Utz, Wellness and the ADA, 20 no. 4 ERISA LITIG. REP. (NEWSL.) 1, 5–6 
(2012). 
 132. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–74. 
 133. See EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011); BNSF 
Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012). 
 134. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1. 
 135. See Utz, supra note 131, at 4–5 (discussing Seff). 
 136. See id. at 4–6; Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75. 
 137. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012). 
 138. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373. 
 139. See id. There is no precedent about what constitutes a term of a bona fide health plan in 
reference to wellness programs: 
The court did not, it appears, look directly at the terms of the health plan document to 
determine whether the wellness program was a term of the health plan.  In fact, it appears 
the health plan document was not even included in the record before the court.  But the 
court identified three facts as being sufficient in the aggregate to establish that the 
wellness program was a term of a bona fide benefit plan (the health plan), so as to enjoy 
the ADA exemption. 
Utz, supra note 131, at 4. 
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discounts on insurance in return for meeting health promotion requirements.140  
Although the plaintiff argued that the discount to participating employees was 
in fact also a penalty for non-participating employees, the court dismissed that 
argument and did not analyze the state law in depth. 141   Concerning the 
exemption requirement that a wellness program be “based on underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering such risks,”142 the Seff court relied on the 
county’s assertion that the wellness program was implemented after discussions 
with a health consultant.143  The health consultant provided research showing 
that wellness programs lower insurance premiums and that the county could use 
the aggregate health data collected in the biometric screenings and health risk 
assessments to shape future health plans.144   Though there is little research 
regarding the financial connection between wellness programs and lower health 
insurance costs for employers, 145  the court seemed willing to take the 
assumption at face-value that the county would use the wellness program data 
to underwrite and classify risks.146  In addition, the court did not find evidence 
of subterfuge, as was necessary to dismiss earlier safe harbor provision cases,147 
but instead made a blanket statement about the importance of the program to 
employees, whether they were disabled or not.148 
                                                            
 140. See Utz, supra note 131, at 4; see also Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (noting no contrary 
Florida law). 
 141. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75; Utz, supra note 131, at 4. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012). 
 143. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1371, 1373–74. 
 144. Id. at 1371–72, 1374; Utz, supra note 131, at 5. 
 145. See Mattke, supra note 21, at xxvi, 53, 107. 
 146. Utz, supra note 131, at 5.  Broward County cited a decision in the Third Circuit, Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), to support its stance that their wellness 
program need not be justified by actuarial data.  Utz, supra note 131, at 5; Ford, 145 F.3d at 611–
12.  However, the EEOC’s 1993 interim guidance suggests that this data should be considered.  See 
EEOC NOTICE, NO. 915.002, §§ III(C), V(1) (June 8, 1993), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/health.html.  For a discussion on the safe harbor provision and its interplay with the 
insurance industry, see Shuman, supra note 79, at 558–59.  Shuman discussed the legislative history 
of the safe harbor provision and the tension between affording rights to disabled individuals and 
bowing to the insurance industry: 
[T]he statute appears to be purposefully vague in order to satisfy contending interest 
groups.  Unable to decide on exactly what it intended to legislate, Congress inserted 
language which looks in two directions.  One provision attempts to appease the insurance 
industry; the other provisions attempt to help the large group of disabled people. 
Id. at 556 (quoting Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 190 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 107 
F.3d 359 (1997)).  See also Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Safe, But Not Sound: Limiting Safe Harbor 
Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured Employers Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 101 MICH. L. REV. 840 (2002). 
 147. See supra Part I.C. 
 148. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (claiming that the program is “enormously beneficial” 
but not detailing how); Nina G. Stillman & Andy R. Anderson, Wellness Program Falls Within 
ADA Safe Harbor, MORGAN LEWIS (Sept. 18, 2012) https://www.morganlewis.com/ 
index.cfm/publicationID/7a2d92f8-bb88-4336-9965-79125ed375cf/fuseaction/publication.detail 
(discussing the Seff appellate case). 
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B.  The Safe Harbor Provision and the Unresolved Issue of Voluntariness 
Obfuscate Otherwise Legitimate Discrimination Claims Under the ADA 
The broad exemption in the ADA for wellness programs opens the door to 
discrimination against obese employees who may be disparately impacted by 
penalties for not meeting supposedly voluntary wellness program 
requirements. 149   Because the five factors necessary to exempt a wellness 
program from ADA regulations were interpreted broadly in Seff, it is relatively 
easy for wellness programs to qualify for a safe harbor exemption.  Therefore, 
obese individuals who either choose not to participate or do participate but do 
not meet certain requirements may be penalized based on their weight, which is 
a condition that is increasingly covered under the ADA.150  As a result, the safe 
harbor provision of the ADA may serve as a shelter for employers who create a 
system of discrimination against obese employees.151  These employees will 
have limited recourse because the discrimination takes place under the broad and 
largely undefined umbrella of ADA-exempt “voluntary” wellness programs.152 
                                                            
 149. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1482–83, 1492, 1495 (discussing how the judicial and 
legislative journey in defining the boundaries of wellness programs as penalties has only begun, 
and how implementation of these programs “could exacerbate” economic disparity); see also Sarah 
Ritz, The Need for Parity in Health Insurance Benefits for the Mentally and Physically Disabled: 
Questioning Inconsistency Between Two Leading Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 
263, 294 (2003–04) (“The safe harbor provision disturbs the statutory framework by exempting 
traditional, discriminatory insurance practice from Title 1 constraints.  It was not included in the 
original bill but was later added ‘to reassure the insurance industry and other covered entities that 
the ADA would not disturb current insurance underwriting practices.’”) (citing H. Miriam Farber, 
Note, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided Health Care 
Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 861, 916 (1994)).  For 
a discussion on how those considered disabled under the ADA can be discriminated against, see 
Shuman, supra note 79, at 561.  Shuman discussed how the employers’ and insurers’ “burden” to 
satisfy safe-harbor requirements for their programs is “not very high.”  Id.  Shuman illustrated this 
with a discussion about an insurer charging higher rates against a person with AIDS, and an 
administrator treating mental disabilities differently than other disabilities as long as there is “sound 
actuarial data.”  Id. 
 150. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1482, 1487 (overviewing the five factors, and the two 
requirements needed for wellness programs to fall within the safe harbor provision); see generally 
Jennifer Dianne Thomas, Mandatory Wellness Programs: A Plan to Reduce Heath Care Costs or 
a Subterfuge to Discriminate Against Overweight Employees?, 53 HOW. L.J. 513, 514–15 (2010) 
(opining that penalties allocated with wellness programs could discriminatorily target overweight 
individuals who otherwise do not have health issues that average weight persons may have). 
 151. See Ritz, supra note 149, at 275 (“The safe harbor provision . . . provides [that,] . . . 
[e]ssentially, as long as a disabled person is disabled enough to produce a real financial risk, they 
can be discriminated against.”); but see Ziegler, supra note 146, at 849 (noting that Congress’ intent 
for the safe harbor provision was not for it to be a “trump card” to permit discrimination, but to 
make sure that the insurance industry for the self-insured was not disrupted).  See S. REP. NO. 101-
116, at 850 (1989) (Conf. Rep.) (intending to limit the reach of insurers and employers by requiring 
that they present sound actuarial evidence to support differential treatment of employees). 
 152. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 75 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357 (stating that programs that are voluntary and abide by confidentiality 
regulations are acceptable activities); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q.22 (pointing 
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The presumption of voluntariness in Seff and the EEOC’s conflicting 
definition of “voluntary” set the stage for increased ADA litigation involving 
obese employees.153  The Seff court did not hold that a twenty-dollar surcharge 
rendered a wellness program “involuntary” under the ADA, despite the EEOC’s 
guidance that a wellness program is only “voluntary” if the employer neither 
requires participation nor penalizes employees who do not participate. 154  
Employers are increasingly using aggressive financial incentives to “push the 
boundary between voluntary and coercive.”155  As employers up the ante, it will 
become easier for employees to argue that they are being penalized for not 
participating in a program or for participating but not meeting program 
requirements, and these penalties may not only run afoul of the ADA’s 
regulations on wellness programs but also increase the likelihood of a disparate 
financial impact on obese employees.156 
                                                            
out that a program is voluntary if employees are not required to participate or not penalized for not 
doing so); ADA & GINA: Incentives for Workplace Wellness Programs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (June 24, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2011/ 
ada_gina_incentives.html (stating that the Commission has not taken an official position regarding 
what extent employers are permitted to offer incentives to participate in wellness programs); Baird, 
supra note 129, at 1490–91 (explaining that until incentives for participating in wellness programs 
are defined, determining the legality of programs is a “highly subjective” standard, and that a clear 
line defining the ADA’s ability to narrow the scope of wellness programs has not yet been defined 
by courts); see also Joseph J. Lazzarotti, An Introduction to Wellness Programs: The Legal 
Implications of “Bona Fide Wellness Programs,” 6 BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 270, 274 (2006) 
(explaining that it is unclear whether, and to what extent, incentives abrogate voluntariness but 
maintaining that employees may try to challenge wellness programs). 
 153. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1492 (“Perhaps because of the relatively small $20 penalty 
for non-participation the court in Seff assumed voluntariness without explicitly addressing it.”); see 
also ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q.22 (noting the voluntariness requirement). 
 154. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 155. Baird, supra note 129, at 1490.  Penn State University’s wellness program has recently 
garnered much attention for being overly intrusive in its employees’ lives.  Natasha Singer, Health 
Plan Penalty Ends at Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/09/19/business/after-uproar-penn-state-suspends-penalty-fee-in-wellness-plan.html.  The 
university imposed a one-hundred dollar monthly fee on employees who chose not to fill out a 
questionnaire about their jobs, marital situation, finances, and, for females, whether she planned to 
become pregnant.  Id.  Penn State adopted a wellness program at the suggestion of its health care 
claim administrator.  Id.  The president decided to suspend the fee after uproar from faculty and 
staff regarding the privacy intrusion and the punitive nature of the program.  Id.; see also Tom 
Emerick & Al Lewis, The Danger of Wellness Programs: Don’t Become the Next Penn State, 
HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK (Aug. 20, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/08/attention-human-
resources-exec/ (suggesting to employers that making employees answer intrusive questions should 
be avoided, and that offers should be made as incentives to answer such questions). 
 156. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1489–91 (noting that “as the incentive differential is 
permitted to increase, so does the likelihood that a court would strike down a program as 
incompatible with the ADA.”); see also Natasha Singer, Rules Sought for Workplace Wellness 
Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/25/business/rules-sought-for-workplace-wellness-questionnaires.html?_r=0 (reporting that 
lawmakers are encouraging the EEOC to issue guidelines on how far employers may stretch the 
term “voluntary”); Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The rise of wellness programs in the workplace is a positive development 
because of the improvement in employee health and the potential lowering of 
medical costs.  However, these programs are breeding grounds for a rise in 
discrimination claims under the ADA.  As the obesity epidemic grows and courts 
increasingly categorize obesity as a disability,157 the decision in Seff has set the 
stage for an influx of discrimination claims in the context of employer wellness 
programs.158  The Seff decision is in discord with courts’ increasing leniency in 
ADA cases159 by categorizing any potential discrimination claim as an exception 
to the ADA under the safe harbor provision.  The Seff court’s decision, by 
interpreting the safe harbor provision of the ADA too broadly and ignoring the 
requirement that wellness programs be voluntary, undermined the broad 
protection for individuals with disabilities, in particular obese individuals,160 















                                                            
Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 197 (2008), available at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/487/2012/10/Wellness_paper_PDF.pdf 
(recommending that the voluntary nature of participation should be emphasized by employers to 
garner support of a program’s legality in light of the dearth of case law defining voluntariness). 
 157. See Jennifer Vallor, Gut Check: Why Obesity Is Not a Disability Under Tennessee Law 
and How the Legislature Can Address the Obesity Epidemic, 9 TENN. J.L & POL’Y. 265, 283  (2013) 
(noting that after the ADA 2008 Amendments, federal courts have begun to recognize obesity as a 
disability); see also Laura C. Hoffman, The U.S. Supreme Court’s “Disability” in Statutory 
Construction: the Debate Over the Interpretation of the Definition of “Disability Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) & the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 14 SCHOLAR 913, 943 
(2012) (positing that if obesity becomes an accepted disability, claims will increase). 
 158. See supra Part III. 
 159. See supra Part I.B. 
 160. See, e.g., Steven C. Sizemore, A Fatter Butt Equals a Skinnier Wallet: Why Workplace 
Wellness Programs Discriminate Against the Obese and Violate Federal Employment Law, 11 
WYO. L. REV. 639, 660–61 (2011). 
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